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Abstract 
Jordan is the only Arabic country that has granted full citizenship to all its 
Palestinian residents, who now constitute half the population and dominate the 
private sector. Although a reasonable expectation would be that Palestinian-
Jordanians hold half of all governmental positions, a 1997 survey reported much 
lower representation. This thesis attempts to investigate current (early 2009) 
Palestinian-Jordanian representation within the state apparatus, the institution that 
shaped it, and how Palestinian-Jordanians and Transjordanians frame this 
representation. 
Through a field study made in Jordan, this thesis found that Palestinian-
Jordanians are still underrepresented. No public discussion is held on the topic, 
but there seems to be a general ambiance toward this disproportionate 
representation. The notion of path dependency helps explain how the policy of 
preferential recruitment of Transjordanians into the political establishment—
which emerged in response to the civil war in 1970—became a self-reinforcing 
institution. Interviews with 15 Jordanian academics and public officials revealed 
how views of government representation varied. While the Transjordanian elite 
frame it as fair, Palestinian-Jordanians frame their underrepresentation as 
discrimination. Since both frames and institutions are self-reinforcing, this thesis 
concludes that Palestinian-Jordanians will most likely continue to be under-
represented in Jordanian public life unless the contextual setting changes. 
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1 Introduction 
At the beginning of 2009, the world’s eyes were fastened on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict in Gaza, where blockades and Israeli bombardments killed 
more than 1300 Palestinians and thousands of people were left homeless in the 
remaining chaos. Developments there were sending chock waves to the other side 
of the Jordan River. Thousands of Jordanians joined in massive demonstrations on 
the streets of Amman to express their abhorrence and their allegiance with the 
people in Gaza. As the closest neighbor in the east, the Jordanian regime—and 
even more so the people of Jordan, of whom at least half originate from 
Palestine—has always stressed its commitment to the Palestinian cause. In fact, 
Jordan’s distinctive feature is an amalgamation of two closely related, but 
different, populations: the original Transjordanians and the later Palestinian 
arrivals. To an outsider, this division might seem minor. But although language, 
religion, and general appearance are the same, it does matter whether you are 
“Jordanian-Jordanian” or “Palestinian-Jordanian”. 
Some months before the crisis in Gaza, I spoke with a taxi driver on my way 
home from my studies at Jordan’s largest public university—the University of 
Jordan. He told me that, like me, he had studied political science for five years at 
this same university. But after having applied for jobs within the Jordanian 
establishment for three years without success, he decided to take work as a taxi 
driver. Why was he refused employment? According to him, simply because he 
was Palestinian-Jordanian. Could this be true?  
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
“Jordan is [...] so situated, politically and geographically, that whatever happens 
to it affects everything else in the region,” writes Arthur R. Day (1986:3) about 
this small, stabile buffer state surrounded by more wealthy or powerful states in 
the heart of the Middle East1. While many researchers have reflected on Jordan’s 
strategic role and engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, few have looked 
inside the country to study its domestic features.  
Unlike countries such as Lebanon and Syria, Jordan grants full citizenship to 
all resident Palestinians—except for the 120,000 refugees originally from the 
Gaza Strip (UNRWA). Palestinians are thus Jordanians. In fact, a Fafo2 report 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 See Appendix A: Map of Jordan 
2 A study based on results from the Jordan Living Condition Survey, a cooperation between Department of 
Statistics in Amman and Norwegian Fafo Research Foundation. (see Arneberg 1997) 
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from 1997 shows that Jordanians of Palestinian origin live in conditions similar to 
those in other households in Jordan, except for the small portion living in 
UNRWA3 refugee camps. Figures differed only in employment—other Jordanians 
had a far higher occupation rate in the public sector than did those of Palestinian 
origin.  
Rania Qadiri, a journalist with Newsweek and the New York Times, states 
that there is a general ambiance in Jordan toward discrimination of Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin within government. At the same time, the Jordanian 
constitution4 states that “the Government shall ensure work […] within the limits 
of its possibilities [...] and equal opportunities to all Jordanians”, prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of race, language, or religion. Assuming that 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin make up about 50 percent of the population5, a 
representation ratio less than that is considered disproportionate.  
So this thesis aims to investigate:  
(1) Current representation of Palestinian-Jordanians within the Jordanian 
state apparatus6. 
(2)  What institution or institutions emerged from historical processes to 
create the current situation. 
(3) The framing of Palestinian-Jordanian representation within the 
Jordanian political establishment by the two groups. 
1.2 Disposition 
To give the reader an understanding of the context in which the bicommunal 
divide within Jordanian government has emerged, a historical background (1.3) 
precedes the definitions of Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians applied in 
this thesis (1.4). A theoretical take-off (1.5) contains a brief introduction to the 
theoretical approaches and definitions of the key concepts institution and frame. 
The methodological discussion in chapter two contains reflections from the field 
study. Chapter three starts with a more comprehensive account of the historical 
institutionalist path dependency argument, paving the way for analysis and 
process-tracing of the East Banker first institution, which has shaped current 
Palestinian-Jordanian representation in the Jordanian establishment. Framing 
theory (4.1) then helps analyzing why Palestinian-Jordanians (4.2) and 
Transjordanians (4.3) conceive current Palestinian-Jordanian representation 
differently. Chapter five summarizes the findings and presents a conclusion.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. 
4 The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 1952. (Chapter II, Article VI). 
http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html (2009-05-14) 
5 See section 1.4: Who is a Jordanian? 
6 In this thesis, words like establishment, bureaucracy, state apparatus, and government refer to the same thing: 
the Parliament, Cabinet, City Councils, and Embassies. 
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1.3 Historical Context 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a young state. Its present borders emerged 
in the aftermath of World War I when the League of Nations and occupying 
powers artificially redrew the map of the Middle East7. The area that was to 
become Jordan was designated as part of the British Mandate of Palestine in 1920. 
But the British kept it separate to solve strategic problems and appointed the 
Hashemite Abdullah ibn Hussein8 as Emir of Transjordan—an area that had 
previously not existed as a distinct entity—in 1921. (Day 1986:15; Nevo 1998:1) 
New boundaries were imposed on distinct, unrelated population groups—from the 
relatively developed north to the basically nomadic south—which ignored strong 
East-West ties that had existed for centuries. For example, inhabitants of the 
Houran area in the north had strong ties with neighboring regions of Palestine to 
the west but none with the Karak region inhabitants in the south. (CSS 1996:5) As 
an outsider, Abdullah had to not only win legitimacy with the indigenous 
population for his imposed rule but also gain their support for the idea of being 
inhabitants of the new entity (Nevo 1998:1). Thus, the Jordanian state was 
established before the concept of the people within its borders crystallized and 
before the institutions of the modern state were set up (CSS 1996:6).  
During the state-building process, from Transjordan’s foundation as an 
independent entity in 1921 until national independence in 1946, a unique 
Transjordanian identity began to emerge alongside development of a political 
structure. As their state grew in stability, so did the Transjordanians’ sympathy for 
the Palestinians, who had to fight for what Transjordanians more easily achieved. 
(Abu Odeh 1999:30) The 1948 war ended with great losses of Palestinian land to 
the Jewish state of Israel, except for the Gaza Strip (held by Egypt) and the West 
Bank (held by Jordan). More than 700,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from 
their homes, many of them directly to the East Bank of the Jordan River—
Transjordan. In 1950, Abdullah annexed the East and West Banks, granting 
Jordanian citizenship to all Palestinians on both banks, and laid the formal 
political basis for the “unity of the two banks”. (Brand 1995:47)  
Immediately, the Jordanian Kingdom’s demography was transformed. Before 
annexation, Transjordanians numbered about 430,000; by 1950 almost twice that 
number of Palestinians—more than 850,000—joined the population.  Many were 
refugees. Subsequently, elections were held on the East and West Banks to choose 
a new lower house in the Jordanian Parliament to represent both banks. (Day 
1986:21f) But having just lost a war, the prevailing mood among the new citizens 
was one of frustration, despair, uncertainty, and militancy. Politically, they were 
torn by two conflicting aims; most initially refused assimilation into the new state 
in order to emphasize their determination to return to their former homes. For this 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7 See Appendix A: Map of Jordan  
8 The second son of Sherif Hussein ibn Ali, Emir of Mecca, who led the Arab revolt in 1916. This revolt aimed 
to secure independence from the ruling Ottoman Turks and to create a unified Arab state spanning from Syria to 
Yemen. 
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reason, some Palestinians boycotted the elections while others pressed for greater 
representation in Parliament—one that would reflect their majority, which the 50 
percent division did not. In his attempts to enhance unity and gain support, 
Abdullah “adopted” local Palestinians from families whose interests were allied 
with his own and gave them prominent positions in Jordanian government and the 
upper house, in effect, replacing the leadership that had represented the 
Palestinians before the unity. For example, members of the Nusseibeh family of 
Jerusalem and the Tuqan family of Nablus served as ministers in a series of 
cabinet posts, which allowed them to give government jobs to family members 
and friends. Some ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became 
heavily Palestinian. In the early 1950s most of Jordan’s ambassadors were from 
loyalist Palestinian families. (Day 1986:22; CSS 1996:9) 
But at the popular level rebelling political groups flourished among the 
Palestinians, especially on the West Bank. This eventually cost Abdullah his life. 
He was assassinated by a Palestinian in 1951 (Day 1986; 22f). The first years of 
King Hussein’s rule (1953–57) were distinguished by political openness where 
political parties on the two banks entered electoral campaigns with unified lists. 
Regardless of origin, political elites campaigned for political principles, rather 
than parochial concerns; people from Karak won parliamentary seats representing 
Jerusalem, while others from Hebron and Nablus won seats representing Amman 
and Irbid. Social and political unity and fusion were prominent features of 
political life; the two major groups did not oppose each other, nor did sectarian, 
tribal, and regional associations play the role then that they do today. (CSS 
1996:9f) 
Until 1967 the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship, which had become 
increasingly tense, was regarded as an internal Jordanian affair and was never 
viewed as a relationship between two entities, despite establishment of the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 and its demands to represent all 
Palestinians, including those residing in Jordan (CSS 1996:10). The PLO came 
into existence at a crucial point in the integration process of the two banks, when 
many Palestinians already identified themselves as Jordanians, and it caused 
confusion as well as provided a concrete form of alternative attachment for those 
who had not made peace with the Jordanian regime (Abu Odeh 1999:112; Brand 
1995:52).  
After the Arab military defeat in the 1967 war, when the West Bank came 
under Israeli occupation, 250,000 Palestinians crossed the Jordan River to the East 
Bank, most now refugees a second time (Abu Odeh 1999:134). On the Jordanian 
side, this demographical change intensified sensitivity to Israeli claims of “Jordan 
is Palestine”, while an emerging Palestinian identity claimed that the government 
was attempting to “Jordanize” its citizens of Palestinian origin and challenged 
Hashemite claims to Palestinian allegiance. In following years, the PLO set up a 
nearly autonomous administration in Jordan, which led to the 1970–71 civil war 
between Palestinian fedayeen guerillas and the Jordanian army9. After the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 It is important to emphasize that this was not a war between Palestinians and Jordanians, but between 
the state and the fedayeen. For example, most Palestinians in the army fought against the militias 
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Jordanian army’s triumph, order was restored and Hussein was again king of his 
own “East Bank house”. (Brand 1995:53f)  
Although “Black September” was a conflict between the militias and the 
army, it had far-reaching consequences for Jordanian society and politics, where 
sectarian association was becoming increasingly important. The “East Banker 
first” trend emerged, implementing a policy of preferential employment of Trans-
jordanians into the bureaucracy. Meanwhile, many Palestinians migrated to Arab 
Gulf countries during the oil-boom for employment and invested their capital in 
Amman. These developments widened the public-private sector gap that closely 
followed inter-communal lines. (CSS 1996:10f; ibid.) On top of that, the Arab 
League recognized the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people10 in Rabat 1974, which directly challenged King Hussein’s claim to the 
loyalty of Jordan’s West Bank Palestinian citizens. Next, the king suspended 
Jordanian Parliament indefinitely, where half the seats were still appointed to 
West Bank representatives. (Brand 1995:53) 
In the wake of the first Palestinian intifada11, King Hussein announced 
Jordan’s administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. 
This act deprived West Bankers of their citizenship, if not their passports, yet 
national unity within the East Bank was stressed by the king. After 
disengagement, Jordan’s boundaries again resembled those before the 1950 
amalgamation, but the demographic structure did not; at least half the population 
was still of Palestinian origin. (Abu Odeh 1999:229) In the early 1990s the influx 
of about 200,000 Jordanians (mainly of Palestinian origin) from Kuwait, due to 
the Gulf War, again changed Jordan’s demographic structure, while inflation 
drove up food and housing prices, worsened the already critical unemployment 
problem, and “took a particularly heavy toll on the fixed wages of the largely 
Transjordanian state sector” (Brand 1995:55f). Many Transjordanians began to 
feel that control of their country was passing to these repeated waves of wealthy 
“outsiders” who were in a position to acquire even more power; the result was a 
more pronounced East Banker first trend (ibid.). 
In 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP)12 
without Jordan’s knowledge or assistance. The DOP, which has come to represent 
a reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians, paved the way for Jordan to 
open negotiations with Israel, which culminated in the signing of the 1994 peace 
treaty. Together with disengagement, these two accords implied that “Jordan is 
Jordan and Palestine is Palestine”—Transjordanian nationalists could now treat 
Jordanian Palestinians as an alien community; in the 1990s “Transjordanian 
exclusivists began agitating for a more Transjordanian-only Jordan”. (Massad 
2001:14; Abu Odeh 1999:193f)  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
throughout the war, as did Transjordanian fedayeen against the army. Thus, battle lines between the two 
communities were not clear-cut. (Abu Odeh 1999: 183-185) 
10 Presumably even Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin who resided in Jordan. 
11 The first Palestinian ”uprising” started in 1987. 
12 Also known as the Oslo Accords. 
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1.4 Who is a Jordanian? 
Today the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has about 5.8 million citizens 
(Dep.Stat.). Its “indigenous” East Bank population is a heterogeneous mix of 
different groups, including various Bedouin tribes, Syrians, Circassians, 
Lebanese, Armenians, Chechens, Egyptians, and Palestinians, many of whom had 
resided in the area before the country’s establishment in 1921. Jordan has long 
been a haven for people seeking refuge from turmoil elsewhere in the region. 
(Day 1986:57f)  
 
The cut-off date for Palestinians was 1948. Those who came to Jordan in that year 
subsequently remained ‘Palestinians’ [until today’s date], even though they were 
accepted into Jordanian society and given [...] citizenship. It was not an arbitrary 
decision of the Jordanians. It accurately reflected the totally different circumstances 
under which these Palestinians arrived; ... [they] all left unwillingly. (Day 1986:58) 
 
Thus, Palestinians who arrived before 1948 are considered “Transjordanians”. 
Overall, though, the kingdom has failed to create a national identity, where the 
sense of belonging is more important than one’s roots (Khoury 2009). In fact, 
many Jordanians identify themselves more with the tribe, the specific city, or 
geographical area of origin than with the national identity (Layne 1994:45f). This 
gives a more primordial essentialist dimension to it, where the identity is 
considered fixed and unchangeable, instead of a socially constructed phenomenon 
under constant change (Matthews – Solomon 2002:10ff). This also implies that it 
is difficult to “become” Jordanian. Today, the young third generation of 
“Palestinians” in Jordan are still considered “Palestinian”, even though the only 
home it has ever known is Jordan. And although Arabic is the language spoken by 
almost every Jordanian citizen, a Palestinian or Egyptian accent can reveal a 
person’s origin, as can the family name. When dealing with people, Jordanians 
(no matter origin) generally know who they are dealing with.  
In everyday life, this is not a cause of problems. Palestinians, Syrians and 
Jordanians live in the same areas, are friends, and even intermarry13 (Qadiri 
2008). Yet when it comes to politics and important positions within the state 
apparatus, Jordanians of Palestinian origin are referred to as “the other”—a rift 
mainly triggered by the fedayeen episode and Black September in 1970 (Massad 
2001:222). This group is by far the largest of Jordanian “minorities”, probably 
even outnumbering East Bank Jordanians. No official statistics has been made 
public of the number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin residing in the country, 
but estimations vary from 46 percent (43 percent West Bankers and 3 percent 
Gazans) (Braizat 2009; Qatarneh 2009) to over 60 percent (Shobaki 2009; NE 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 If intermarriage continues, this sectarian divide will be increasingly difficult to maintain. To further 
complicate things, according to Palestinan law, you are Palestinian if your mother is Palestinian, but in Jordan 
you are Jordanian if your father is Jordanian. (Qatarneh 2009) 
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2009). This thesis assumes that around 50 percent14 of all today’s Jordanian 
citizens are of Palestinian origin. 
 
1.5 Theoretical Take-Off 
This thesis attempts to explain Palestinian-Jordanian representation in the 
Jordanian state apparatus from two perspectives: (i) the historical institutionalist 
approach, focusing on path dependency, because it is well suited to analyze the 
institution and processes that have formed today’s distribution, and (ii) the social 
constructivist framing theory, because it helps explain why Palestinian-Jordanians 
and Transjordanians within the bureaucracy present different pictures of this 
phenomenon. These distinct theories are explored more thoroughly in chapters 
three and four, in connection with the empirical findings they attempt to explain, 
but here an introductory account is presented.  
 
Historical Institutionalism.  
To historical institutionalists, it is not only the institutional setting, or the 
outcome, that matters. Rather, the emphasis lies on historical dynamics of political 
processes and institutional developments where an institution (such as the East 
Banker first policy) does not emerge from a vacuum, but instead originates from, 
and is imbedded in, concrete historical processes, conflicts, and constellations. 
(see Thelen 1999:369ff) 
A broad definition of institutions will be used, which includes formal 
institutions (such as constitutional arrangements) and informal rules and 
procedures. For example, Peter Hall’s widely accepted definition includes “formal 
or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
14 That Palestinian-Jordanians represent 50 percent of the population is a common assumption. (Abu Odeh 
1999:196) 
With this background, these terms will now be used: 
Transjordanians: Jordanian nationals of Transjordanian origin: 
families resident within the boundaries of present-day Jordan 
before 1948. 
Palestinians: Arab people who are living, or whose families lived, in 
the area controlled by the British Mandate of Palestine—present-
day Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza—in 1920. 
Palestinian-Jordanians: Palestinians who became Jordanian 
nationals after the unity of the West and East Banks in 1950. 
Jordanians: Jordanian nationals, irrespective of origin, who hold a 
Jordanian passport. 
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organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall – Taylor 
1996:938). Institutions matter because they shape, even determine, human 
behavior; actors in organizations are “kept in line” through controls such as 
hierarchies, rules, sanctions, procedures, organizational norms, and reward 
structures (March – Olsen 1989:23f).  
Kathleen Thelen (1999:400) argues, “The key to understanding institutional 
evolution and change lies in specifying more precisely the reproduction and feed-
back mechanisms on which particular institutions rest”. A theoretical approach 
like this enables analysis of underlying reasons behind current political make-up. 
By tracing the historical process of an observed phenomenon, such a sequential 
approach allows us to understand the ways institutions emerge, are 
institutionalized, and continue to evolve over time. This thesis analyzes the 
patterns and mechanisms that limit and prevent institutional change. In other 
words, it attempts to explain processes of path dependency; “outcomes at a 
‘critical juncture’ [formative moment] trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce 
the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future” (Pierson – Skocpol 2002:6). 
So when a given path is taken, it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse or 
change path, which may help explain why institutions are change-resistant15. 
 
Framing. 
For social constructivists, reality is a constantly changing social construct. The 
emphasis lies on how this reality is perceived, interpreted, and presented to others. 
Kaufman et al (2003) mean that to make sense of reality and to organize complex 
phenomena into coherent, understandable categories; frames are indispensable.   
Many definitions of frames and framing exist, but for the purpose of this 
thesis, definitions by scholars such as Tannen and Gray (in Kaufman et al 2003) 
are relevant. For them, frames are “cognitive structures held in memory and used 
to guide interpretation of new experience”. In addition, frames are defined as 
“collections of perceptions and thoughts that people use to define a situation, 
organize information, and determine what is important and what is not” (Lewicki 
in Kaufman et al 2003). 
Needless to say, not everyone uses the same frame. Every story, or frame, 
expresses a different view of reality, or a problem. “Each story constructs its view 
of social reality through a complementary process of naming and framing. Things 
are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed 
for the situation.” (Schön et al 1994:25) Thus, a frame attempts to make sense of a 
complex reality through simplification and selection, and to describe what is 
wrong with the present situation and how it can, or should, be changed (ibid.). 
A sociological approach like this, enables analysis of why various actors 
frame a phenomenon differently. In fact, it helps to explain how colliding frames, 
by creating equally incompatible interpretations of events, can affect the 
endurance of a policy controversy16. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 See section 3.1: Path Dependency 
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2 Materials and Methods  
2.1 The Process-Tracing Case Study 
By attempting to explain Palestinian-Jordanian representation in the Jordanian 
government, this thesis investigates a specific case. To use Eckstein’s 
terminology, this case study is a disciplined-configurative study, which implies 
that established theories are used to explain a certain case. It is thus theory 
consuming (George – Bennet 2005:213). Although not its main purpose, a theory 
consuming study also tests the validity of an established theory (Eckstein 
1992:139; Esaiasson et al 2007:43).  
One strength of the qualitative case study is that it enables a rich, in-depth 
description of a phenomenon that considers contexts and structures (Lundquist 
1993:71). This coincides with the historical institutionalist approach that regards 
political phenomena as complex; such phenomena should be based on “relevant, 
verifiable causal stories resting in differing chains of cause-effect relations whose 
efficiency can be demonstrated independently of those stories” instead of large-N 
statistical analysis (Tilly in George – Bennett 2005:205).  
Both the theoretical perspective and the methodology used in this case study 
emphasize the usefulness of process-tracing. This method attempts to “identify 
the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism—between 
an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable 
[in this case Palestinian-Jordanian representation]” (George – Bennett 2005:206). 
The process-tracing technique has foremost been used in studies with an initially 
well-known result, and where the course of events that brought it about is 
traceable (Esaiasson et al 2005:145). This research design well depicts the method 
this thesis uses. So this is a within-case analysis, which aims to describe the 
causes of effects in detail. 
Ideally, process-tracing tracks all steps in an event to ascertain the 
development of a specific causal chain. But the use of analytical explanation17 
delimits the variables studied; since historical institutionalism is the theoretical 
approach used, individual actors will not be included. In addition, the limitations 
of this thesis prevents inclusion of all potential steps in the process. The aim is to 
view the events of Jordanian history over time, to trace at least one plausible chain 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
17 Analytic explanation is one version of process-tracing, which converts a historical narrative into an analytical 
causal explanation embedded in explicit theoretical forms. (See George – Bennett 2005: 211)  
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of events that can help explain the current limited representation of Palestinian-
Jordanians.  
This method might be criticized for being deliberately selective, because the 
researcher, based on previous research, focuses on “what are thought to be 
important parts of an adequate or parsimonious explanation” (George – Bennett 
2005:211). Because this thesis retains an open stance toward the theoretically 
chosen variables (the institutions), the process-tracing theory seemed to be the 
theory that best reflects the exploratory character of this thesis and was chosen—
after an extensive search for a theory that could explain the unique case of 
Palestinian-Jordanian representation in Jordan. Thus, theory was chosen to match 
the case; the case was not chosen to illustrate theory. 
2.2 Reflections on Field Research in Jordan  
This thesis focuses on a topic that is highly sensitive in Jordan and rarely 
discussed in public (CSS 1996:3). Most Jordanians tend to be biased on the 
issue—wishing to make it appear that Palestinian-Jordanians are fully represented, 
or woefully underrepresented—which fosters perceptions rather than reality (M. 
Al-Masri 2009). These tendencies have negative impacts on a study that attempts 
to explain “reality”. Lack of transparency and official statistics further 
complicated the search for valid information. However, these obstacles were 
largely overcome through a quantitative data collection (see 2.2.1) and interviews 
(see 2.2.2) with politicians and academics who are well acquainted with the 
situation. Besides, prevalent perceptions are used in the second part of the analysis 
(chapter 4) to explain Palestinian-Jordanian representation from the popular 
perspective. 
2.2.1 Screening the Jordanian Bureaucracy: Quantitative Data 
Collection 
To get a fair picture of actual Palestinian-Jordanian representation within the 
Jordanian decision-making bureaucracy, some sort of quantitative material is 
required. So one step was to collect lists of cabinet ministers, members of the 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and Amman City Council officials18. Lists of 
Jordanian ambassadors were requested, but due to security measures, this task 
failed.  
The origin of a person is fairly accurately traced by surname in Jordan and 
neighboring countries, so local assistance was employed to translate names and 
determine whether the person was of Transjordanian or Palestinian-Jordanian 
origin. Again, for the purpose of this study, to investigate Palestinian-Jordanian 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
18 See Appendix B for an overview of the Jordanian state apparatus. 
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representation, the Transjordanian definition refers to Jordanians of Syrian, 
Lebanese, Egyptian, Circassian and other Arabic origin. The name lists were 
processed by several authorities to minimize sources of error, careless mistakes, 
and bias (see Esaiasson et al 2007:321). In this way, a picture based as much as 
possible on fact instead of perception was built up. These figures were especially 
useful for comparison with Abu Odeh’s similar screening of Palestinian-Jordanian 
representation in 1997 (Abu Odeh 1999:231). His definitions of Jordanians 
coincide with the ones applied in this thesis. 
2.2.2 Interviews of Public Officials and Academics: Qualitative Data 
Collection 
Because the issue examined in this thesis is sensitive and has been sparsely 
investigated, especially in recent years, the qualitative interview was an evident 
choice for gathering first-hand information about happenings behind locked doors 
in Jordanian political bureaucracy and decision-making today. Fifteen interviews 
were made in Amman between December 2008 and February 200919. 
Four interviews were conducted with powerful key actors within the Jordanian 
bureaucracy, two of Palestinian origin and two Transjordanians. These are 
particularly interesting interviewees since popularly elected parliamentarians and 
actors appointed by the king are a focus of this thesis. For example, Adnan Abu 
Odeh is probably the most outstanding Palestinian-Jordanian politician, having 
served as political advisor to King Hussein and King Abdullah II. He also wrote 
the book Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemites in the Middle East Peace 
Process, which may be the most extensive work on the Palestinian-Transjordanian 
domestic relationship yet published. In addition, two lower civil servants were 
interviewed to reflect the lower levels in the hierarchy and a Palestinian-Jordanian 
employee within a prominent western NGO, who regards himself as excluded 
from Jordanian decision-making. These interviewees were considered interesting 
because of their centrality (see Esaiasson 2006:291) and personal stories. The aim 
was to give equal room and time to Palestinian-Jordanians and Transjordanians, 
even though it became obvious during the interview that those of Palestinian 
origin were more devoted to the questions and consequently unfolded their 
answers to a greater extent. 
These interviews had an informant and a respondent character (Esaiasson et al 
2006:), so that prime information of procedures and so on, besides personal 
reflection, would be communicated. To get a more neutral, comprehensive picture 
of this loaded issue and the political system and situation in Jordan in general, 
more interviews were conducted with Jordanian academics and journalists. But 
complete neutrality is obviously impossible to attain. Although, some of the 
academics were clearly more distanced to the subject than others, no one is 
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immune to framing or bias. Moreover, the interviews were conducted within one 
month of the Gaza conflict, which might have influenced responses. 
Due to the sensitivity of the subject, and to avoid misunderstandings, most 
interviews were held in English (with two exceptions in Arabic). Although this 
greatly limited the number of potential interviewees, theoretical saturation 
(Esaiasson et al 2006:309) was attained where informants confirmed each other 
and answers recurred. To make contact with informants, snowball selection 
(Esaiasson et al 2006:291) was first applied, one personal contact leading to 
another. Within the Amman academic and political world, everyone knows each 
other, which greatly simplified the process of contacting interviewees.  
The interviews were exploratory in character in so far as they did not follow a 
strict pattern or structure (Kvale 1997:117). The peculiarity of each interviewee 
and the intention to allow each informant to steer the direction of the interview 
made this necessary. Nevertheless, the interviews were not completely 
unstructured; they included some common questions20 and some queries tailored 
to each interviewee to maximize information without straying from the subject. 
This open approach probably resulted in more unexpected responses and profound 
reasoning than if a cross-examination had been held.  
Moreover, it is important to mention the variety of settings in which the 
interviews were conducted, especially since Jordan is a non-democratic country. 
Most informants were still in service and were interviewed in their institutional 
setting. Others were interviewed at private offices (one was retired) so they 
represented themselves, not their employers, which reduced the possibility of self-
censorship. Due to the sensitivity of the subject studied, some interviewees 
demanded anonymity. All interviewees participated in this thesis voluntarily, and 
some informants were interviewed or contacted more than once for further 
clarification and information. Follow-up opportunities are definitely a positive 
feature of the interview method (Esaiasson et al 2006:283). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
20 See Appendix D for Interview Guide. 
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3 From Civil War to Asymmetric 
Power Institution 
3.1 Path Dependency 
Path dependenc[y] has to mean [...] that once a country or region has started down a 
track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the 
initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same 
trunk, there are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to 
turn around or to clamber from one to the other—and essential if the chosen branch 
dies—the branch on which a climber begins is the one she tends to follow. (Levi in 
Pierson 2000:252) 
 
With these words, Levi summarizes the core of the historical institutional path 
dependency argument, which is based on two claims. The first involves arguments 
about “crucial founding moments of institutional formation” that send institutions 
along broadly different and unpredictable paths (cf. ‘critical junctures’). The 
second claim suggests that “institutions continue to evolve in response to 
changing environmental conditions and ongoing political maneuvering but in 
ways that are constrained by past trajectories” (Thelen 1999:387). The first 
stresses discontinuity, sequencing, and timing, while the second focuses on 
mechanisms for continuity. 
Pierson (2000:252) argues that the latter claim—continuity—is well captured 
by the concept of increasing returns, a notion borrowed from the rationalist 
school. In an increasing returns process, the likelihood of further steps along the 
same path increases with each move down that path. This is because “the costs of 
exit—of switching to some previously plausible alternative—rise” over time 
(Pierson 2000:252). Path dependent patterns are therefore characterized by self-
reinforcing positive feedback mechanisms, which can lead to institutions that 
become increasingly blocked, if not entirely cut off (Thelen 1999:392ff). 
Consequently, earlier events matter much more than later ones, and different 
sequences may have different results (Pierson 2000:253). This suggests that it is 
hard to change an institution, even when it outlives its usefulness. According to 
Pierson (1993:607), even the most rational actors can behave in ways that are 
collectively suboptimal once an institution is adopted.  
Drawing on insights about mechanisms conducive to path dependency of 
technological processes, Pierson (2000:254) argues that similar mechanisms 
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operate in the fields of politics to produce sunk costs and vested interests to 
particular policy paths. These positive feedback mechanisms are; large set-up or 
fixed costs, learning effects (“learning-by-doing”), coordination effects, and 
adaptive expectations. 
But the complex political world differs in many ways from the flexible 
economical one. Pierson (2000:257) mentions four interconnected aspects of 
politics that make this sphere of social life conducive to path dependency 
processes: (i) the central role of collective action, (ii) the high density of 
institutions, (iii) the possibilities of using political authority to enhance 
asymmetries of power, and (iv) intrinsic complexity and opacity. For example, he 
argues that due to the prevalence of adaptive expectations, actors must constantly 
adjust their behavior to how they expect others to act when “picking the wrong 
horse may have very high costs”. Even in voting, in absence of a pure system of 
proportional representation, the actions of a person who does not want to “waste” 
his vote may well turn on what he expects others to do.  
Yet concerning the topic of this thesis, the third aspect Pierson mentions is the 
most relevant. Politics is characterized by disagreement over the goals of and 
disparities between those in power; in fact, institutions are not neutral 
coordinating mechanisms but often reinforce and magnify particular patterns of 
power distribution in politics (Thelen 1999:394). Pierson argues that path-
dependent processes over time can transform a situation of balanced conflict, in 
which one set of actors must openly impose its preferences on another set, into 
one in which power relations become so uneven that assumed reactions and 
ideological manipulation make open political conflict unnecessary (2000:259). 
Both Mahoney (in Pierson 2000:259) and Thelen (1999:394) emphasize that 
institutions actively assist the organization and empowerment of certain groups 
while actively disarticulating and marginalizing others. Thus, over time, path 
dependency increases power asymmetries and makes power relations less visible. 
The allocation of authority to specific actors is a key source of the self-reinforcing 
mechanisms that characterize an institution. (Pierson 2000:259) 
But the groups that are disadvantaged by prevailing institutions do not 
necessarily disappear, and their adaptation to the situation can imply something 
different from embracing and reproducing the institution. For them, adapting may 
mean awaiting their time until conditions shift, or working within the existing 
framework with goals different from—maybe even subversive to—those of the 
institution and its designers. (Thelen 1999:386) 
3.2 Process-Tracing the East Banker First Institution 
Below follows an account of the emergence of the East Banker first policy, and its 
path up to today. Since the West Bank belonged to Jordan until 1988, this section 
contains two parts: before and after disengagement. 
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3.2.1 From Critical Juncture to Disengagement 
When preferential recruitment of Transjordanians in the state bureaucracy began 
is undisputed. All literature and every interviewee emphasize how tensions during 
the fedayeen episode (1968–71), which culminated in Black September, had a 
crucial impact on the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. This basically prompted 
the Transjordanian elite to regard Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians as 
two distinct communities. Before that, political life in Jordan was rich and 
communal ties were insignificant. Within public administration, Palestinian-
Jordanians and Transjordanians were mixed, working side by side, with a nearly 
50:50 proportion. (Shobaki 2009; Tell 2008) But after the civil war, the Jordanian 
state felt betrayed and began to mistrust citizens in general and Palestinians in 
particular. Whether it was to placate Transjordanians and secure their loyalty and 
support, to punish Palestinian-Jordanians, to improve security, or some 
combination of the three, a gradual shift in policy occurred with the introduction 
of Transjordanian allotment in the bureaucracy. (T. Al-Masri 2009; Brand 
1995:53) Thus, Black September illustrates the formative moment, or the critical 
juncture, of the East Banker first institution. 
The first significant reduction in Palestinian-Jordanian representation occurred 
in 1974, some weeks after ratification of the Rabat Resolution, which recognized 
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people—regardless 
of domicile—in disagreement with King Hussein who, naturally, also regarded 
himself as the representative of the Palestinian-Jordanians who resided on the East 
and West Bank and were Jordanian citizens. In the new cabinet, formed by Zeid 
Al-Rifa’i, the percentage of Palestinian-Jordanian ministers dropped from 46 to 
20, and Parliament—in which West Bankers controlled 50 percent of the seats—
was suspended. In addition, some Palestinian-Jordanian government personnel 
were let go and replaced by Transjordanians (Day 1986:62; Abu Odeh 1999:211). 
In the 1976 cabinet, only four of the 18 ministers were Palestinian-Jordanian. Four 
of the 14 Transjordanian ministers were known Transjordanian nationalists (Abu 
Odeh 1999:213), which indicated that the de-Palestinianization process had begun 
in earnest. 
In the late 1970s, the Likud21 gained power in Israel. According to their 
political ideology, Jordan, or the East Bank, was originally part of Palestine. Thus, 
the Palestinians already had their state—Jordan—which legitimized the Israeli 
policy of building settlements in the West Bank that was implemented. The 
Jordanians viewed this as a strategy for depopulating the West Bank of 
Palestinians, which was Jordan’s nightmare and could only imply additional 
influxes of Palestinian refugees. When Israel re-elected the Likud in 1981, King 
Hussein tried to establish an alliance with the PLO to find a political resolution. 
To pressure Yasser Arafat, Parliament (suspended since 1974) was activated in 
1984. Since half of the members of Parliament were West Bankers, this 
reactivation sent an implicit message to the PLO that Jordan had another choice 
for partnership—the West Bankers. (Abu Odeh 1999:213-221) In 1984 the 
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Palestinian-Jordanian Adnan Abu Odeh was appointed minister of the royal 
court—the king’s political advisor—which is one of the most important positions 
in Jordan. In April 1985, a one-time increase in proportion of Palestinian-
Jordanians cabinet ministers to the pre-Rabat level occurred (to 10 Palestinian-
Jordanian ministers of 23) to symbolize the equal affiliation that a confederal 
agreement22 envisaged. (Abu Odeh 1999:221ff) 
Despite King Hussein’s intense efforts to cooperate with the PLO (1982–88), 
all failed. In the wake of the first Palestinian intifada, Parliament was dissolved 
and administrative and legal disengagement from the West Bank inaugurated. 
(ibid.) Even though Palestinian-Jordanian representation in the 1985–89 cabinet 
was relatively high, the government did not curb the de-Palestinianization policy. 
In the period between Rabat and disengagement, a level of one-third Palestinian-
Jordanian representation in the cabinet was upheld, but with some volatility 
depending on Jordanian-Palestinian relations at the external level, which 
immediately affected internal levels (in this case, representation of Palestinian-
Jordanians in high governmental positions) (Tell 2008). 
3.2.2 From Disengagement to Rigged Elections 
In his disengagement speech, Hussein strongly stressed the issue of national unity. 
But contrary to the king’s words, Transjordanian nationalists within the 
bureaucracy interpreted the speech as approval of the ongoing East Banker first 
policy and an indication to start promoting institutionalization of Transjordanian 
domination over Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordan (Abu Odeh 1999:227f; Massad 
2001:262f). 
After disengagement, a new election law for the House of Deputies that 
excluded the West Bank had to be legislated. The number of governorates 
increased by seven, to match demographic and economic changes of the preceding 
30 years. This in turn raised the number of districts and, thus, the number of seats 
for deputies, from 30 for the East Bank before 1988 to 80 for Jordan afterwards. 
Except for one governorate with a high concentration of Palestinian-Jordanians 
(Az-Zarqa), the other six new governorates were overwhelmingly populated by 
Transjordanians. Of the 80 seats total, three were allocated to Circassian and 
Chechen minorities, six to Bedouins, and seven to Christians (six of these to 
districts where most Christians are Transjordanians). Thus, in the worst-case 
scenario for Transjordanians—and best-case for Palestinian-Jordanians—
Transjordanians would occupy 15 of 16 seats for minorities. Transjordanians and 
Palestinian-Jordanian Muslims competed for the remaining 64 seats. (Abu Odeh 
1999:229ff) 
But the new election law favored rural areas that were not populated by 
Palestinian-Jordanians. Consequently, according to Abu Odeh’s calculations, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
22 The Amman Accord, signed on 11 February 1985, in which Jordan and the PLO called for total Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories (Abu Odeh 1999: 221f). 
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Palestinian-Jordanians could secure at most 20 seats, or 25 percent23. Knowing 
this, it is hardly surprising that Palestinian-Jordanians occupied only 13 seats in 
the lower house between 1993 and 1997 (Abu Odeh 1999:229-31; M. Al-Masri 
2009). Senators in the upper Parliament house are appointed, not elected, as are 
cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and other key and senior posts24. Why, then, did 
allocation have this shape in 1997, when Palestinian-Jordanians constituted 50 
percent of the population? (See table, next page.) 
Preferential recruitment of Transjordanians into the state bureaucracy—which 
emerged in response to Black September in the early 1970s—had clearly become 
an institution. After disengagement in 1988, the divide increased, leading to 
Palestinian-Jordanian representation of less than one-quarter in positions of power 
in state administration (Tell 2008). A substantial drop occurred immediately after 
the Peace Accords in 1994, when 4 of the 31 (12.9 percent) cabinet ministers were 
Palestinian-Jordanian (ibid.). 
This trend has continued during the reign of Abdullah II—who took the throne 
after his father’s death in 1999—even though the new queen, Rania, is of 
Palestinian origin. Despite a new electoral law in 200125, the imbalance between 
population and geographical position was still ignored; thus, representation ranges 
from 45,000 individuals per seat in urban districts (as in Amman, which is densely 
populated by Palestinian-Jordanians) to 10,000 citizens per seats in others 
(Hourani 2004:41).  
Even though the election law was designed to prevent Palestinian-Jordanians 
from achieving political power through democratic means, elections could still be 
rigged, as were some in 2007, such as those to City Hall Amman26 (Shobaki 2009; 
Khoury 2009). According to Taher Al-Masri (2009), Al-Mukhabarat (the 
Intelligence Agency) was enormously active, preventing the Islamic Action 
Front27 from attaining majority. Since most hard core Islamists are Palestinian-
Jordanian, the election law both prevents high Islamic and Palestinian-Jordanian 
representation. (Shobaki 2009) With this in mind, we turn to the situation today 
and compare it with Abu Odeh’s survey from 1997.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
23 Only 25 percent of the seats would be secured if all Palestinian-Jordanians voted purely on a communal basis. 
24 See Appendix B for an overview of the Jordanian state apparatus. 
25 E.g., the voting age was lowered from 19 to 18 and the number of electoral districts increased from 21 to 45, 
bringing the electoral system closer to the ”one man, one vote” system. (Hourani 2004) 
26 An important note is that the majority of Amman’s inhabitants are Palestinian-Jordanian. In 1986 they 
constituted 75 percent of the population (Day 1986:59), today the percentage may be higher. 
27 The political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan.   
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Transjordanians  Palestinian-
Jordanians 
 Palestinian-
Jordanians (%) 
 1997
a 2009b  1997a 2009b  1997a 2009b 
Cabinet ministers 18 22  6 6  25 21 
Ambassadors 39 *  6 *  13  
Key and senior posts 80 *  20 *  20  
Members of Parliament         
Lower house (elected) 67 93  13 17  16 15 
Upper house (appointed) 33 12  7 43  18 21 
Members of City Hall         
Lower council (elected) ** 19  ** 15   44 
Upper council (appointed) ** 24  ** 10   29 
* Information unavailable to author, ** Not investigated; a Abu Odeh 1999:321; b Material for 
screening Jordan’s bureaucracy was collected in December 2008 and January 200928.  
 
None of the 12 governorates have Palestinian-Jordanian leaders—nor do any of 
the ministries have a secretary general of Palestinian origin (US 2007; US 2008). 
Estimations of the number of Jordanian ambassadors of Palestinian origin exist 
vary from 1 to 9 out of 55 (M. Nabulsi 2009; Nahar 2009; T. Al-Masri 2009). 
3.3 Analyzing the Features and Mechanisms of the 
East Banker First Institution 
Clearly, the East Banker first policy has shaped, and even determined, the 
behavior of political actors in Jordan. Over the last 40 years, through path 
dependency, it has transformed a situation of balanced conflict into one of 
asymmetric power. The de-Palestinianization trend is an obvious case of an 
institution that actively empowers certain groups (the Transjordanians) while 
marginalizing others (the Palestinian-Jordanians), as Thelen argues. The only 
formal institution that favors Transjordanians above Palestinian-Jordanians is the 
election law, which only concerns the House of Deputies. How then is such low 
representation of Palestinian-Jordanians maintained? 
Most interviewees agreed that it is common knowledge that important posts 
are intended for Transjordanians (e.g. Mohammad 2009; Qadiri 2008; T. Al-Masri 
2009)—it is an informal institution. Here, adaptive expectations are a factor. For 
instance, since it is known that the Mayor of Amman (a position never held by a 
Palestinian-Jordanian) should be Transjordanian, no one will jeopardize his or her 
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  19 
position by suggesting a Palestinian-Jordanian for the post. Due to the humiliation 
Palestinian-Jordanians felt after the 2007 elections outcome, there is considerable 
risk that fewer Palestinian-Jordanians will candidate or participate in the next 
election since it is a “hopeless case” (T. Al-Masri 2009). This might lead to even 
lower Palestinian-Jordanian representation and turnout29.  
An important feature of Jordanian society is tribal affiliation, and this has had 
a significant impact on politics. In a country without political parties, voters vote 
for persons who might be able to increase their power, or broadly interpreted, the 
tribe. As Linda Layne writes about Jordan, “there has been a striking degree of 
personal and familial continuity in the holders of political office, even in the 
context of drastic changes in the political atmosphere over time” (1994:112). 
Consequently, whether Transjordanian or Palestinian-Jordanian, one must belong 
to a large tribe to get promoted. Tribes such as Al-Majali and Al-Fayez, who have 
proved loyal and supportive of the regime, are notably well represented in 
positions of power within Jordan’s establishment (Qadiri 2008; Hamarneh 
1997:172). Thus, not all Transjordanians are preferentially recruited. In addition, 
wasta (connections) is used extensively within Jordanian bureaucracy to create 
advantages for oneself and relatives (T. Al-Masri 2009; Samira 2009; M. Al-
Masri). In this way, Transjordanians reinforce and spread their power and 
authority, while marginalizing Palestinian-Jordanians who have less wasta. 
Powerful Transjordanians who benefit from this system naturally have a great 
interest in preserving it, since a more democratic system would lessen their power.  
Although many government positions are influential, it is the king who enjoys 
real power. He is the one who appoints the prime minister and his cabinet, the 
Mayor of Amman, the ambassadors, and the senators, among others. But these are 
mostly appointed due to political experience as e.g. cabinet ministers, which 
naturally increases the chance that a Transjordanian will be appointed. (M. Al-
Masri 2009) In addition, the king does not make his appointments through 
personal chemistry but is surrounded by advisors with long political careers, 
presumably most of them Transjordanians, who make suggestions. Al-
Mukhabarat30 must also approve, which further decreases prospects of 
Palestinian-Jordanian appointments for security reasons. (Mohammad 2009) This 
implies that the same kind of people (Transjordanians from influential tribes) get 
suggested, which perpetuates a vicious circle. Between 2003 and 2007, King 
Abdullah II encouraged the upper house to more closely reflect social 
composition by appointing journalists and cultural artists to Parliament. The 
experiment failed, though, and the previous division returned (ibid.; M. Al-Masri 
2009). 
Long employment in the state apparatus—starting in the 1920s through 
participation in the military and institution-building—has given the Trans-
jordanians administrative experience and knowledge that the Palestinian-
                                                                                                                                                        
 
29 There is already a low turnout in big cities that are overwhelmingly populated by Palestinian-Jordanians. In 
the 3rd district of Amman only 30 percent votes, while in small cities the turnout is around 70 percent. (T. Al-
Masri) 
30 The Intelligence Agency is an organization with even higher Transjordanian dominance. (Brand 1995:53) 
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Jordanians do not possess (Shobaki 2009). The East Banker first institution is thus 
also characterized by self-reinforcing learning effects. 
To conclude, the East Banker first policy is largely an informal institution that 
is underpinned by positive feedback mechanisms such as learning effects and 
adaptive expectations, as Pierson predicted. Many interviewees emphasized the 
difficulty of reorganizing the system: when kinship ties, tribal affiliation and the 
extended family are still important, there will be “no new blood in the 
organization” (M. Al-Masri 2009). This implies that intentional discrimination is 
not necessarily the reason for low Palestinian-Jordanian representation. But since 
the ruling Transjordanian elite’s interest in keeping this system is great, and the 
increasing returns process has been allowed to operate for 40 years, it is 
theoretically difficult to change paths. As Muin Khoury (2009) puts it, “It would 
have been much easier to solve this ‘rift’ during the 1970s. The problem is 
becoming more complicated the longer time passes… Now it is extremely 
complicated”. 
 
  21 
4 Two Colliding Frames of 
Palestinian-Jordanian Representation 
4.1 Framing and Colliding Frames 
To understand and interpret the world we live in and represent it to others, we use 
frames. By labeling a phenomenon, we give meaning to some aspects, while 
rejecting others that might appear irrelevant. Thus, “frames provide meaning 
through selective simplification, by filtering people’s perceptions and providing 
them with a field of vision for a problem” (Kaufman et al 2003). 
But framing is not just an instrument for interpreting events, it can also be 
used to promote strategic advantage (Kaufman et al 1999:164ff). Schön et al 
clarify that framing has a big impact on policy-making and on influencing public 
opinion. “Policy positions [just like frames] are resting on underlying structures of 
belief, perception, and appreciation” (1994:23f). Difficulties appear when various 
frames collide with each other. Schön et al see policy controversies “as disputes in 
which the contending parties hold conflicting frames” (1994:23). When we are 
involved in a controversy, we have an extraordinary ability to ignore the facts 
affirmed by our antagonists, by focusing our attention on different facts and by 
interpreting the same information differently. Consequently, the ability and will to 
“patch” our arguments to assimilate counterevidence and oppose countervailing 
arguments seems to be stronger than the virtuosity of reconciliation. (Schön et al 
1994:5)  
 
Frames are not free-floating but are grounded in the institutions that sponsor them, and 
policy controversies are disputes among institutional actors who sponsor conflicting 
frames. The actors are in contention with one another; the frames they sponsor are in 
conflict, in the sense that they represent mutually incompatible ways of seeing the 
policy situation. (Schön et al 1994:29) 
 
This, in turn, often results in enduring policy controversies and intractable 
conflicts. Since frames are self-reinforcing, shared through community story-
telling and socially reinforced through community interaction, they are quite 
stable over time, even when certain actors move in or out of the picture. In 
addition, frames interact, often in ways that tend to reinforce the stability of other 
frames. (Gray 2003:13) Together these factors tend to result in institutionalized 
political contention, “leading either to stalemate or to pendulum swings from one 
extreme position to another, as one side or another comes to political power” 
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(Schön et al 1994:8). Yet in some intractable conflicts, frames are modified 
through intervention or changes in context, and this “reframing”, in turn, has 
increased the tractability of the conflict (Gray 2003:15f; Schön et al 1994:38ff). 
4.2 The Palestinian-Jordanian Frame 
All Palestinian-Jordanians interviewed consider the Palestinian-Jordanian 
situation within the Jordanian decision-making apparatus to be worse today than 
before; representatives are fewer (T. Al-Masri 2009; Abu Odeh 2009; Ahmad 
2009). As Adnan Abu Odeh says, “Today Palestinian-Jordanians are treated as 
residents, not as citizens”. According to him, the few Palestinian-Jordanians who 
have powerful positions within the establishment are chosen to cover up for real 
discrimination; but they are just “faces” who play the regime’s game and exercise 
no real participation. (Abu Odeh 2009) 
Ahmad perceives himself as a victim of this discrimination. Two years ago he 
applied to become an attaché at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is the first 
phase of a diplomatic career. After having passed the written exam with 
distinction, he was dismissed at the interview because he was “one month too old” 
(at age 28 and one month)31. This reason upset Ahmad who was certain that if he 
had been 35 years old and had wasta, he would have been accepted. He is highly 
qualified and is currently employed by a prominent western NGO where his origin 
does not restrain him. (Ahmad 2009) 
 
You are always looked at as Palestinian-Jordanian. There is no hope since I don’t 
belong to [a certain] tribe. When Al-Mukhabarat [who approves attachés] sees that you 
come from a tribe that has proven loyal to the king and the state during long time, your 
chances increase manifold [while decrease if your name is Palestinian]. This fact is very 
frustrating. You cannot change your origin. [...] I want to feel like a [complete] citizen – 
feel accepted!” (Ahmad 2009) 
 
”Palestinian[-Jordanian]s of course want to be part of the decision-making. But 
since they have almost no chance of getting a job within this sector, they have 
kind of given up.” (T. Al-Masri 2009) In addition, Ahmad mentions that 
Palestinian-Jordanians fear losing their passport due to saying something 
inappropriate or being active in, or starting, a political activity or party. “The 
passport is the only privilege of being a Jordanian citizen.” (Ahmad 2009) 
Palestinian-Jordanians feel like they are considered disloyal, or perhaps even 
permanent suspects, which has led to political passivity (Abu Odeh 1999:198). 
Actually, Abu Odeh says that he is the only one who has raised the issue of 
increasing Palestinian-Jordanian representation, which he did on the Arabic news 
channel Al-Jazeera two years ago, but as a result he has been permanently 
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boycotted from the government. In fact, he is the one Palestinian-Jordanian who 
has worked at the top of the Jordanian establishment more than 30 years, having 
been one of King Hussein’s closest co-workers and even one of the ministers in 
the military cabinet set up during Black September. Despite this, he is now known 
for his “disloyalty” since he addressed the issue of discrimination. Only a handful 
of people stood by his side; in his words, “There is no national memory, just a 
tribal memory”. (Abu Odeh 2009) 
The Palestinian-Jordanian interviewees stressed their commitment to Jordan. 
For example, Taher Al-Masri (2009) says, “I am Jordanian. My sentiments are 
with Palestine, but my life is here now, and I want what’s best for this country.” 
Even after a possible solution of the Palestine problem, most Palestinian-
Jordanians would stay in Jordan (Qadiri 2008; Khoury 2009). But Taher Al-Masri 
does admit that there is a conflict in “enjoying full citizenship and still being 
guaranteed the right of return”32. For this reason, he would not demand 
completely equal representation. On the other hand, Muin Khoury (2009) 
considers this a simple issue: “Now the third generation of Palestinians are living 
in Jordan as Jordanian citizens—they should have the same rights and 
opportunities as Transjordanians.” Though he admits that the Transjordanians are 
not the only ones to blame, Palestinian-Jordanians must also change their mindset 
and act as Jordanian citizens; some “still live in a dream. [However] the dream of 
the Palestinian state is old”. At the same time, Transjordanians must accept the 
fact that Jordan is not a transit zone for Palestinians and stop living with the 
illusion that there are no Palestinians in the country. “Say come or go! Now we 
are living in an intermediate position—we are put on hold in a frozen state.” 
(Khoury 2009) Taher Al-Masri (2009) considers Al-Watan Al-Badil33 already a 
reality in Jordan; 35 percent of Jordanians are UNRWA-registered refugees and 
42 percent of all Palestinian refugees live in Jordan, which exceeds the combined 
population of Gaza and the West Bank.  
All Palestinian-Jordanian interviewees emphasize the importance of this issue. 
“It is important to bring [it] up. If we continue keeping silent, it will keep growing 
inside.” (Ahmad 2009) But according to Abu Odeh, there is no spokesman for the 
Palestinian-Jordanians. “I was. And the suppression of me silenced everyone else. 
They do not want to loose more. [...] They are just covers.” In fact, during the 
interview, Taher Al-Masri was working on a document for reform that proposed 
increased representation of Palestinian-Jordanians. But he says that he cannot 
raise the issue in the Senate, since the speaker is very conservative. “So what I 
will do with it, I don’t know …” 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
32 According to UN Resolution 194, article 11, Palestinian refugees have the right of return; thus, the right to 
citizenship, financial settlement and, in some cases, return to former homes in what is today Israel.  
33 Al-Watan Al-Badil means the ”alternative homeland” and refers to Jordan as the solution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, where Palestinians can live. This phenomenon is also called the Jordan Option. 
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4.3 The Transjordanian Frame 
Omar Nahar, Director of Policy Planning and Research at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in Amman, does not want to distinguish Palestinian-Jordanians from 
Transjordanians. He considers talk of clashes to be exaggerated: 
 
The fragmentation is a poison. [...] We are living as a family; a unity. [...] I have to 
stress the fact that all Jordanian citizens are Jordanians. The Jordanian ambassadors are 
Jordanian, representing His Majesty the King and his country [whether they are 
Transjordanians, Circassians or of Palestinian origin]. (Nahar 2009) 
 
The Transjordanians interviewed stress the fact that representation of other 
minorities, such as Circassians, is high and pointed out that the prime minister, 
Nader Al-Dahabi, is of Syrian origin. Taher Al-Masri (prime minister in 1991) is 
also mentioned as a successful Palestinian-Jordanian example. (Dr. Al-Abbadi 
2009; Nahar 2009) According to Nahar, discrimination does not exist within the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where everyone can apply on equal terms in a fair 
system without wasta. He continues, “Everyone who lives in Jordan enjoys full-
fledged citizenship rights …”  
The reason for low Palestinian-Jordanian representation within the Jordanian 
establishment is rather seen as derived from the Palestinian-Jordanians themselves 
than a deliberate Transjordanian policy. Since wages are low within the Jordanian 
public sector, compared to wages in the overwhelmingly Palestinian-Jordanian 
private sector34, there is little interest in working within the Jordanian bureaucracy 
among Palestinian-Jordanians, according to Qatarneh and Nahar. That only one 
Palestinian-Jordanian out of 45 was writing the final exam in the “Diplomatic 
Program” in 2008 shows that “the best ones just don’t apply …” (Tell 2008) “ … 
Palestinian[-Jordanian]s simply do not look for these posts” (Qatarneh 2009). 
According to Nawaf Tell, this has been the trend during the last 10 years. “If we 
should try to activate more Palestinian-Jordanians, we need a quota. Like with the 
women. And is that democracy?” (Qatarneh 2009) But Dr. Memduh Al-Abbadi 
(2009) says that an increase in Palestinian-Jordanian representation must come 
gradually; “there should not be decisions from above”. According to him there 
already exists “a positive trend” with more Palestinian-Jordanians in positions of 
power in the Jordanian establishment. 
Yet, Nahar acknowledges that it would be a security risk for the Jordanian 
state if Palestinian-Jordanians feels greater affinity to Palestine than to Jordan (cf. 
Black September). This is an illustration of Transjordanian suspicion of 
Palestinian-Jordanian loyalty to Jordan. But this security dimension was not 
seriously tackled during the interviews with the Transjordanian politicians. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
34 A 1996 study conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies showed that Palestinian-Jordanian capital 
participation in the country was 86.6 percent compared to Transjordanian participation, which amounted to 11 
percent. (Abu Odeh 1999: 196) Actually, the Jordanian bourgeoisie is predominantly Palestinian-Jordanian. 
(Shobaki 2009) 
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Instead, Dr. Al-Abbadi clarified that the issue of “underrepresentation” of 
Palestinian-Jordanians is not discussed, whether within Parliament or elsewhere in 
powerful political bodies. “There are just foreigners asking these questions, 
seeking problems; we don’t.” (Dr. Al-Abbadi 2009) Finally, though, especially 
when it comes to the army and the Intelligence Agency, Dr. Al-Abbadi admitted 
that it is a proactive safety measure not to let many Palestinian-Jordanians work 
there: 
 
We will not play with those places! We are not in Sweden. We are in the Middle East, 
surrounded by conflicts. We have been struggling and are working very hard for the 
stability and security we have. It is also in the interest of the Palestinian[-Jordanian]s, 
maybe more so than for the [Trans]jordanians, to maintain this stability, because of all 
their investments in the country. They want to save their money, of course.  
4.4 And the Security Frame? 
Surprisingly, while none of the Transjordanian politicians interviewed mentioned 
the Jordan Option and the Transjordanian fear that they might become a minority 
in their own country, the other interviewees emphasized this issue. In fact, the 
security dimension is Transjordanians’ main argument for low Palestinian-
Jordanian representation, to prevent another Black September. Al-Watan Al-Badil 
was mentioned, also by the king35, in connection with the Gaza conflict, which 
raised worries of more Palestinian refugees fleeing over the Jordan River.  
Already before the conflict in Gaza, Rania Qadiri (2008) said that the option 
for Palestinians on the West Bank to move to Jordan seemed to be a more 
acceptable one as the situation at the other side of the Jordan River was becoming 
more difficult (Qadiri 2008; Abu Odeh 2009). According to Fares Braizat (2009) 
there are Palestinians becoming new Jordanian citizens every day, which in the 
long run implies further demographical change that could lead to political change. 
Palestinian-Jordanian underrepresentation is a way of hindering internal conflict. 
And certainly, an influx of additional Palestinians, since they concerning politics 
are seen as “the other”, would be a strategic threat to the Transjordanian political 
elite, given the civil and political rights that Palestinians in Jordan enjoy as 
Jordanian citizens. 
Muin Khoury and Yasar Qatarneh spoke of how the Transjordanian 
establishment brings up the issue of an alternative Palestinian homeland “when it 
suits them”; “when the state is in trouble it is used to ‘cover’ other problems. It is 
like a scarecrow!” (Khoury 2009); “… like waves that are coming and going” 
(Qatarneh 2009). When the issue is brought up occasionally, it “keeps old wounds 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
35 see, e.g., ”King warns of a plot against the Palestinian people”, 
http://en.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=206 (2009-02-05). Also John Bolton, former US ambassador to 
the UN, argued for ”the three state option”, where Gaza is returned to Egyptian control and the West Bank 
reverts to Jordanian sovereignty. (see Bolton 2009) 
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[from 1970] open”, which creates and maintains the rift (Khoury 2009). 
According to Mohammad Al-Masri (2009), Al-Watan Al-Badil is simply a 
concept that the Transjordanian political elite uses to scare Transjordanians and 
secure their power base when they feel threatened and to maintain status quo. As 
many interviewees stressed, Jordan’s current demography—but not Jordan’s 
political establishment—has already realized the Jordan Option.  
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5 Conclusion 
The notable underrepresentation of Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordanian 
government—considering they constitute half the Jordanian population—cannot 
be denied. This thesis shows how this twisted divide has increased in the last 40 
years. The response to Black September, the deliberate East Banker first policy, 
was the starting shot for an institution that, due to path dependency, has become 
increasingly blocked, with a continuous decline in recruitment of Palestinian-
Jordanians into the state apparatus. This vicious circle has been perpetuated 
through self-reinforcing mechanisms that characterize an institution, such as 
adaptive expectations and learning effects. Thus, through path dependency, the 
East Banker first institution has transformed a situation of balanced conflict 
(before 1970, when representation was equal) into one of asymmetric power 
today. In addition, it has been underpinned by Palestinian-Jordanian relations at 
external level and clearly influenced by developments on the other side of the 
Jordan River. For example the disengagement in 1988, giving the PLO legal and 
administrative responsibility of the West Bank, led to a new election law to the 
lower house of Parliament, favoring rural areas dominated by Transjordanians 
above the overwhelmingly Palestinian-Jordanians urban areas. 
Clearly, Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians within government each 
have distinct perceptions of this institution—in fact, their frames represent 
mutually incompatible ways of viewing Palestinian-Jordanian under-
representation. For example, Palestinian-Jordanians interpret the fact that there are 
few attachés at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as proof of discrimination while 
Transjordanians perceive it as evidence of no Palestinian-Jordanian interest in 
working within the government. According to the Transjordanian frame, all 
Jordanian citizens have equal opportunities, irrespective of origin, and 
discrimination is non-existent. In contrast to Palestinian-Jordanians, Trans-
jordanians frame the East Banker first institution as fair and see no reason for 
bringing the issue up for discussion—rather, the Transjordanian frame justifies it. 
Since Transjordanians clearly benefit from the existing institution, which actively 
empowers them, this is hardly surprising. With a more democratic system, where 
tribal affiliation and wasta are less important, the Transjordanian elite would be 
less powerful. Today power relations within the Jordanian political establishment 
between Transjordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians have become so uneven that 
no open conflict is necessary. The state-sponsored, official Transjordanian frame 
is thus the visible one, while Palestinian-Jordanians struggle to even visualize 
their frame of discrimination without being suppressed.  
Yet, the recurring waves of Al-Watan Al-Badil in Transjordanian political 
discourse, whenever the state is in trouble or the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
becomes twisted, reveals a Transjordanian fear of losing power to Palestinian-
Jordanians. So Transjordanians do not appear to regard their power base as 
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completely secured, which is understandable when the Jordanian demographical 
make-up differs significantly from the decision-making one.  
Since frames are self-reinforcing, as are positive feedback mechanisms that 
characterize institutions, the official Transjordanian frame and the East Banker 
first institution will most likely opt to stay on their current paths. No signs of 
Transjordanian political will to increase recruitment of Palestinian-Jordanians into 
the Jordanian decision-making apparatus are in evidence. Even discussing the 
subject is taboo. Such preconditions give little hope for improvement in the 
situation for Palestinian-Jordanians. It seems as if outside impetus is needed—
perhaps a solution to, or even some change in, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? 
5.1 Zooming Out: The Issue in the Big Context 
This thesis has attempted to shed light on a complex, sensitive issue in Jordan: 
Palestinian-Jordanian representation in the state apparatus. While I was in 
Amman, the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) was in the planning phase of an 
extended project on this topic. My hope is that these plans will be realized so that 
this sensitive issue is opened up for public discussion, and that the findings of this 
thesis can in some way contribute to the CSS project. 
Lastly, I want to put the issue of domestic Palestinian-Transjordanian relations 
in perspective on a larger scale. What almost every informant emphasized was 
that Jordan’s current demographic make-up is the result of the actions of one 
entity: Israel. “Jordan is just trying to solve the problems Israel started. It 
interferes everywhere and is the cause of all conflicts in the Middle East. [...] 
Yesterday we had headache. Today fever. Tomorrow the flu.” (Braizat 2009) 
Clearly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had major consequences for Jordan, 
who has shouldered the main responsibility for the Palestinian refugee stream. 
However, despite imbalances and underrepresentation, Jordan is the only Arabic 
country in which all Palestinian refugees are granted national citizenship and 
passports, and it is thus still the best place for Palestinians to live. 
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Appendix A: Map of Jordan  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Abu Odeh 1999:2) 
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Appendix B: Chart of the Jordanian 
State Apparatus 
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Appendix C: Interviews 
Representatives from the Jordanian State Apparatus 
 
Transjordanians 
 
Dr. Memduh Al-Abbadi  
Member of the House of Deputies (first representative for Amman’s 3rd district) 
Former Mayor of Amman and Minister of Health (2009-02-02) 
 
Mr. Omar Nahar 
Director of Policy Planning and Research, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman 
(2009-01-28) 
 
”Mohammad”36 
 Lower civil servant (2009-01-20, 2009-01-26) 
 
”Samira”  
Lower civil servant (2009-01-26) 
 
 
 Palestinian-Jordanians 
 
Mr. Adnan Abu Odeh 
Former political advisor to King Hussein and King Abdullah II (2009-01-29) 
 
Mr. Taher Al-Masri  
Vice President of the Senate  
Former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-01-31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
36 Names within quotation marks are pseudonyms. 
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Representatives from outside the Jordanian State 
Apparatus 
 
Transjordanians 
 
Dr. Fares A. Braizat 
Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies (2009-01-27) 
 
Dr. Mohammed Al-Masri 
Center for Strategic Studies (2009-01-19, 2009-02-05, 2009-02-09) 
 
Mr. Mohammad Nabulsi 
Center for Strategic Studies (2009-01-18) 
 
Dr. Yaser Shobaki 
Independent debator and critic (2009-01-27) 
 
Dr. Nawaf W. Tell  
Director, Center for Strategic Studies (2008-12-22) 
 
 
Palestinian-Jordanians 
 
Mr. Muin Khoury 
Director, Research Department, The Royal Hasehemite Court (2009-01-31) 
 
”Ahmad”  
Administrative officer of prominent NGO (2009-02-04) 
 
 
Transjordanian/Palestinian-Jordanian 
 
Mr. Yasar A. Qatarneh 
Director, Regional Center on Conflict Prevention, Institute of Diplomacy (2009-
02-09) 
 
  
 Independent 
 
Mrs. Rania Qadiri (Lebanese) 
Correspondent, Newsweek and New York Times (2008-12-17) 
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Appendix D: Interview Guide 
Although not all interviewees were asked the same questions, here are some 
common ones. 
 
 
- Do you agree that the state appears to be divided on a politically bicommunal 
basis? 
   
 
- If yes, what is the reason for 
this bicommunal rift? When 
did it emerge? 
 
 
- Do you think that there has been a change in Palestinian-Jordanian 
representation since King Abdullah II came to power? Greater or lesser 
representation? 
 
- Can you describe the employment process? To become an attaché, for 
example, on which grounds is he or she chosen? How did you become 
employed?  
 
- Is the issue of few Palestinian-
Jordanians within the Jordanian state 
apparatus discussed in public at your 
workplace? 
 
 
- Do you think this imbalance could be corrected? If so, how? 
- Deliberate policy? If so, constitutional? 
- Security problem? Jordan Option? 
- Unwritten rule? 
- Wasta? 
- Transjordanian experience? 
- Is the issue too sensitive? 
- Is there no will to raise the 
issue? 
- What would happen if 
someone did raise it? 
